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Oil Prices and Inflation
The price of oil rose 35 percent immediately
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait-from about
$20 a barrel to $27. Since then, prices have been
relatively high and volatile, and an outbreak of
armed conflict could send the price of oil even
higher. Thus, even though other OPEC producers
expect eventually to make up most of the short-
fall in oil supplies resulting from the embargo
against Iraq, it is possible that higher oil prices
will persist, providing a sustained shock to the
u.s. economy.
This Letter examines the effects of such a shock
on price inflation in the u.s. A rise in the price of
oil has a direct effect on the prices of final goods
and services, as higher energy costs are passed
through to consumers. Whether higher oil prices
lead to a permanent increase in either the price
level or the rate of inflation, however, depends on
both the response of the Federal Reserve and the
effect on expectations of future inflation.
To ensure that the price level does not remain
permanently higher as a result of a rise in oil
prices, the Federal Reserve would have to allow
non-oil prices to adjust to offset the effects of
higher oil prices. Such an adjustment would
require the economy to grow more slowly for
a time. Furthermore, if expectations of higher
inflation generate higher wage inflation, tem-
porarily slower growth also would be required
to prevent a permanent increase in the rate
of inflation.
To estimate the inflationary consequences of
the recent 35 percent increase in. oil prices, this
Letter examines both the direct effect on overall
prices and the indirect effect operating through
inflation expectations.
The direct effect
A change in the price of oil has both direct and
indirect effects on overall prices. These effects
can be understood in terms of a simple model
of the infiationary process that describes overall
price movements as a function of changes in the
price of non-labor inputs, wages, and inflation
expectations. In this model, final goods prices
are equal to the sum of the cost ofthe labor
required to produce a unit of output ("unit
labor cost") plus a mark-up to cover the
costs of non-labor inputs, including energy.
This mark-up changes as the costs of non-labor
inputs change. Thus, a rise in oil prices raises the
mark-up and, therefore, the prices of final goods
and services~ Historically, a 35 percent increase
in the price of oil has raised the level ofthe GNP
price index by about 1Y4 percent through this
direct channel. The effect on consumer prices
is about 50 percent larger because this index
includes the prices of imports (including the
higher prices of imported oil), while the GNP
price index does not include imports.
The direct effects of higher oil prices on the
price level will not persist, however, as long
as the Federal Reserve does not accommodate
these higher prices by allowing an increase in
the stock of money. In this case, higher oil prices
will cause economic activity to slow and unem-
ployment to rise temporarily. Wage inflation will
moderate and offset the increase in the mark-up
associated with higher oil prices. However, if the
Federal Reserve attempts to counter the weaken-
ing in economic activity with a larger stock of
money, an oil price increase can have a perma-
nent effect on the price level.
Indirect effect of expectations
In addition, if expectations are affected, higher
oil prices can permanently raise the rate of price
inflation through higher wage inflation. In the
model, the rate of wage inflation is a function of
the unemployment rate and the expected rate of
price inflation. The unemployment rate provides
a measure of demand pressure in labor markets.
When the demand for labor is strong, as meas-
ured by a low unemployment rate, wages will
tend to rise because firms will bid them up
trying to attract workers.
Competition in the labor market also occurs
against the background of workers' and firms'FRBSF
expectations regarding the future rate of overall
price inflation. Workers will demand higher
wages to compensate them for higher expected
prices in the future. For this reason, when there
is neither excess demand nor excess supply in
the labor market, wages will tend to rise at a rate
equal to the expected rate of price inflation plus
the expected growth in labor productivity. As a
result, expected real (inflation-adjusted) wages
will rise only as fast as productivity. The expected
rate of price inflation will be realized as this
rate of wage inflation is passed through to
higher prices.
However, when the unemployment rate is
low, and job vacancies exceed the number of
unemployed, competitive pressures will push up
wages at an even faster rate than the expected
rate of price inflation plus the growth in produc-
tivity. These higher wage costs are then passed
through to prices, and actual inflation will ex-
ceed expected inflation until firms and workers
raise their expectations offuture inflation. How-
ever, once they revise their expectations, and
these expectations get reflected in wages and
ultimately in prices, there is a further rise in
actual inflation. Thus, in this situation, a wage-
price spiral can occur, whereby inflation con-
tinues to accelerate as long as the demand for
labor exceeds the supply of workers.
Because inflation expectations cannot be
observed directly, in most models, including the
one used here, expected inflation usually is rep-
resented by the rate of inflation over the recent
past. Empirically, past inflation has an influence
on current and future inflation. This may arise
because market participants form their expecta-
tions adaptively, by extrapolating past inflation
forward. Alternatively, expectations may be more
forward-looking than this, but staggered, multi-
year labor contracts introduce an element of
inertia in the wage-setting process so that past
inflation has an influence on the current and
future rate of wage inflation.
Oil prices and expectations
How does an oil price shock affect expectations
offuture inflation? Labor market participants may
realize that an oil price "shock" represents a
one-time change in a relative price that need not
affect the rate of overall price inflation in the long
run. As such, wages would not need to rise to
compensate for it.
However, labor market participants may not
be able to discriminate perfectly between a one-
time shock to the price level and other develop-
ments that would lead to a permanent increase
in the rate of inflation. If they cannot or do not
do so, higher oil prices may raise expectations
of future inflation, leading to extra wage infla-
tion, and therefore additional price inflation.
The extent to which expectations of future
inflation are affected also depends, in part,
on the credibility of the Federal Reserve's com-
mitment to maintaining price stability. If labor
market participants believe that the Federal
Reserve will accommodate the pressures from
oil prices, a wage-price spiral could ensue even
though the initial shock was only transitory in
nature. On the other hand, if the market believed
the Federal Reserve would not accommodate a
transitory shock, there would be no effect upon
inflation expectations, and wage inflation would
not augment the direct effect of higher oil prices.
Combining the two effects
To see how an increase in oil prices might affect
long-run inflation, consider the following simple
example. Suppose there is a permanent increase
in the price of oil that causes the mark-up and
overall price inflation to rise by one percentage
point this year. This is the direct effect of a rise
in oil prices. Wage inflation this year would be
unaffected by this price rise. However, assuming
that the rate of inflation that is observed this year
is fully reflected in expectations of future infla-
tion, wage inflation and hence price inflation
will be one percentage point higher next year
even though the direct effects ofthe higher
price of oil will have gone away.
Moreover, to the extent the Federal Reserve
accommodates these expectations by allowing
the money supply to grow more rapidly, these
expectations will be self-perpetuating, and wage
and price inflation will be permanently higher. In
this way, a temporary oil shock can permanently
raise the rate of inflation.
This is a simple example. In practice, it is likely
that labor market participants distinguish among
the causes of price movements better than this
example suggests. It also is likely that market
participants expect the Federal Reserve to at-
tempt to avoid accommodating the rise in oil
prices. Both of these observations suggest that..... -- .
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have been completed. The extra wage inflation
operating through this indirect channel is at its
highest in the third year, where, on average, it
contributed 0.44 percentage points to the infla-
tion rate during the 1970s, and 0.23 percentage
points in the 1980s. But in either case this extra
wage inflation becomes insignificant after the
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Conclusion
The direct effect of the current oil-price hike
on the price level can be offset gradually by a
non-accommodative policy on the part of the
Federal Reserve. The negative effects on eco-
nomic activity resulting from such a gradual
approach need not be large as long as expecta-
tions do not change and cause wage inflation to
magnify and perpetuate the inflationary pressure.
The estimates presented here reveal that the
response of wage inflation to supply shocks,
such as the current boost to oil prices, tends to
be small and to die out fairly quickly. Moreover,
the wage response has fallen over time as the
market has become more accustomed to fluc-
tuations in the price of oil and as the Federal
Reserve's commitment to maintaining price
stability has become more credible. As a result,
the current oil price shock is not likely to set off
a significant wage-price spiral.
the response of wage inflation to an oil price
shock is likely to be smaller than in the example.
The long-run impact of a rise in oil prices,
therefore, will be muted.
Nonetheless, the simulation shows that because
of the effect on expectations and wage inflation,
the rate of inflation will continue to be higher
even after the direct effects of the price shock
Econometric estimates of the inflation model
described here suggest that the market has
indeed tended to discount the influence of past
oil-price and other supply shocks in forming its
expectations of future inflation. Consequently,
both wage and long-run price inflation have not
been fully responsive to these supply shocks.
Interestingly, the estimates also show that the
degree of discount has increased over time. It is
estimated that 75 percent of past inflation asso-
ciated with the direct effects of supply shocks
was passed through to expectations of future
inflation from the major oil shocks in 1974 and
1979, while only 35 percent was passed through
from subsequent shocks during the 1980s. This
change is most likely due to an increased aware-
ness that such shocks change relative prices and
equilibrium real wages, but need not affect the
price level in the long run. This change also
reflects a stronger faith in the Federal Reserve's
commitment to maintaining stable prices.
Simulation results
To put the current oil shock into perspective,
the accompanying chart shows the simulated
time path of inflation in the GNP price index
following a permanent 35 percent increase in
the real price of oil. The direct effect from the
increase in the mark-up is shown along with the
estimate of the total response in both the 1970s
and 1980s. The simulation assumes an accom-
modative monetary policy that keeps the unem-
ployment rate unchanged. The simulationshows
that through its direct effect on the mark-up, an
oil price shock increases the inflation rate an
average of 0.86 percentage points in the six
quarters following the shock. However, after the
price level has adjusted to the higher oil prices,
there is no further increase in the inflation rate
from this source.
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